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I.
structure
attached fixtures were completely destroyed by a tenant, and Appellant sought to be
reimbursed for the losses under a Policy of insurance issued by Respondent to Appellant.
Respondent denied Appellant's claim, citing exclusions under the Policy. The District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, holding that an exclusion applied and that
there was therefore no coverage for the losses.
The District Court erred in its interpretation of the language of the Policy. In fact, based
upon the plain meaning of the exclusions, and the case law from other jurisdictions interpreting
such language, it is clear that the exclusions cited by Respondent in its denial of coverage do not
apply to the facts of this case, and that Appellant should be reimbursed for her covered losses
under the Policy.

II.

ARGUMENT

A.

Whether There Is A Covered Loss Is Not An Issue On Appeal

Respondent first notes that the issue of whether the insurance policy provided coverage is
not in dispute, and argues that Appellant's first issue on appeal should not address that issue.
The parties are in agreement on this issue. Appellant's initial brief on appeal also noted that the
District Court found "that Respondent had not offered any opposition to the argument that the
loss of her residence was a direct loss covered by the Policy, and thus granted summary judgment
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at 3.

Appellant's Brief correctly noted that the issue of whether the loss was covered was not an issue
on appeal.
However, the issue of whether there was insurance coverage for the loss is an issue on
appeal due to the question of whether the exclusions apply. While there is no question the loss is
a "covered loss," the Policy does not provide coverage if one of the exclusions applies. That is
why the first issue on appeal was whether the District Court erred in holding that there was not
coverage, because of the application of the exclusions, not because the loss was not a covered
loss.

The Policy does not provide coverage if one of the exclusions applies, that is why the first

issue on appeal was stated the way it was.
However, the question of how the issue on appeal was worded is not material, as both
parties agree that there is no dispute that the loss in this case was a covered loss, and that the
District Court held that an exclusion applied and thus dismissed Appellant's claim for coverage.
Thus, the main issue on appeal is whether the District Court incorrectly held that an exclusion
applied and incorrect! y dismissed Appellant's claim for coverage under the policy.

B.

The District Court Erred in Holding that the Exclusion For
Faulty, Inadeguate and/or Defective Work Applied in This
Case

Given the burden imposed upon the insurance company to prove that the exclusion
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it did not prevent claims such as the Appellant's, the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Respondent. Rather, based upon the undisputed facts of record regarding
the unauthorized demolition of the property and based upon the language of the exclusion, the
District Court should have found that the exclusion did not apply and should have granted
summary judgment in favor of Appellant, not Respondent.

In its response, Respondent argues that the exclusion applies based upon its plain
language, and alternatively, that even if the exclusion were read to require consent of the
Appellant for the construction, the Appellant did consent to the demolition in this case. These
conclusions are not supported by the case law or the undisputed facts of record.
1.

The Plain 1\'Ieaning of the Exclusion Requires the Work Be
Performed With the Authorization of the Insured

The District Court incorrectly held that the exclusion for faulty, inadequate or defective
work applied. The exclusion provides in part:
c.

Faulty, inadequate or defective;

(2)

design, specifications, workmanship, repair,
construction, renovation, remodeling,
grading, compaction;

of part or all of any property whether on or off the Described Location.
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so, were faulty, inadequate or defective workmanship, repair, construction, renovation or
remodeling.
First, Respondent argues that it is undisputed that Reynoso was to make "certain

improvements" to the dwelling and that those improvements were not completed and therefore
were inadequate, defective or faulty. This argument ignores the undisputed evidence regarding
what "improvements" were in fact authorized. The evidence shows that Reynoso was
authorized to make some cosmetic improvements if he so chose while residing in the Property.
However, the purpose of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement was to sell the Property and to
Lease it to Reynoso prior to a sale. The purpose of the contract was not for Plaintiff to hire
Reynoso to perform repair or remodel services. Authorizing a tenant to make cosmetic
improvements to a property while living in it is very different from hiring someone to make
repairs or improvements to the Property. Making the cosmetic improvements was not required
under the contract between Plaintiff and Reynoso, nor was Reynoso to be compensated for any
improvements he made. He was merely authorized under the contract to make cosmetic
improvements if he chose to for his own benefit. The Purchase and Sale Agreement's provision
regarding improvements Mr. Reynoso intended to make to the property provided only that:
Buyer intends to make certain improvements to the property upon
possession, with the intent to sell the property for a profit ... the
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The Purchase and Sale Agreement does not define the term "certain improvements" and
only evidence in the record of what "improvements" to the property were contempiated by
the parties is the Affidavit of Shammie Fisher, which states that the "improvements" included
such things as new flooring or upgrades to the kitchen and bathroom floors and counters, new
light and painting. Fisher Aff., at <J[ 9 (R. at 85). There was no discussion or agreement for the
Buyer to demolish or rebuild any portion of the premises or remodel the structure. Id. This is
consistent with the fact that the Buyer indicated that he intended to use the property as his
primary residence during the term of the lease/purchase. See id.; Purchase and Sale Agreement,
at 4, <J[ 19 (R. at 91).

Moreover, the claim for damages in this case is not based upon the "improvements" that
Reynoso was allowed to do as part of the lease agreement. This is not a case where Reynoso tore
out counter tops and failed to replace them, or did a bad job installing tile on the floor in the
bathroom or got paint on the carpet when he was painting. Those might be situations where the
exclusion may apply because the damage would have been caused by the acts of Reynoso in
making improvements that he was authorized to do.
However, the damage in this case was not caused by Reynoso performing the cosmetic
improvements he was authorized to do in an inadequate or faulty manner. Rather, the damages
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"work" performed by Reynoso as allowed under the contract, it stemmed from unauthorized and
unknown actions of Reynoso. Such destruction is not included in the exclusion.
Rather, the exclusion contemplates the situation where a person contracts with another to
do construction or remodel work, and then does a poor job or fails to finish. For example, if
Appellant had agreed to allow Reynoso to remodel the entire structure, and he had abandoned the
project before completion, that might be the type of loss included in the exclusion. However,
there is no evidence that there was any agreement for Reynoso to perform any remodeling or
work that would require the destruction of the premesis; rather, the work was to be cosmetic
improvements only. This is exactly what the Court in Husband v. LaFayette Ins., Co., was
addressing when it held that in order for the exclusion for faulty or inadequate renovation or
remodel to apply, the alterations must be undertaken by the insured or someone authorized by
the insured and the insured must be dissatisfied with the quality of the performance under that
contract. 635 So.2d 309,311 (La.App. 1994) (emphasis added). As that Court held, alterations
"undertaken without authorization and in direct conflict with the terms of the lease . . . fall
outside the exclusion of the policy." Id. In this case, there is no dispute that the alterations to the
property, including its total destruction, conflicted with the terms of the Agreement permitting
only "certain improvements," which Appellant has testified were cosmetic in nature, and were
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argues that the demolition of the residence falls within those definitions. Respondent's
analysis in this regard fails to take into account the meaning of the words when taken altogether,
and what the meaning of the exclusion is when read as a whole. Stating that there is no coverage
for faulty or inadequate "design, specifications, workmanship, repair, construction, renovation,
[or] remodeling" implies that there is some affirmative act on the part of the insured to
commence a project. Either the insured itself commences a project or the insured hires someone
else to do a project. There is no "design" or "workmanship" or "repair" if an unauthorized third
party comes onto property and performs demolition.
Another argument relied upon by the District Court and advanced by Respondent is that
because another exclusion contains language to the effect that an intentional loss is covered only
if it is done by or at the direction of the insured, the fact that such language is not included in the
faulty work exclusion means the work need not be done by the insured or with its authorization.
However, the fact that another exclusion contains the language "by or at the direction of the
insured" does not change the analysis set forth above because, with respect to the faulty
workmanship exclusion, there is no circumstance where a remodel or construction project can be
done on the property of the insured without their consent or direction. If it is done without the
consent of the insured, it is not, by its definition, remodel or repair. Thus, there is no reason to
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However, with respect to the exclusion for intentional loss, an insured could have loss
from an intentional act that was at its direction, or it couid have ioss from an intentionai act done
without its knowledge or consent. That is why the exclusion for intentional loss must contain
language that the loss must be "by or at the direction of the insured" for that exclusion to apply;
because there are two types of loss from intentional acts, and the Policy is only covering one of
them.
Conversely, there is only one type of design, workmanship, repair or remodel of a
property, and that is where an insured or someone authorized by the insured undertakes such
work. There is no such thing as a design, remodel or repair to the property of an insured that the
insured is not either involved in or authorizing. Such destruction or work would not be repair or
remodel, it would be wrongful and unauthorized and would not be covered by the exclusion. For
example, if someone painted graffiti on a wall, that would not be considered remodel or repair of
a property, whereas a contractor hired by an insured painting the exterior of a building would be.
The difference is that one is authorized by the insured and the other is a wrongful act of
destruction not authorized by the insured.
In sum, the language of the exclusion, when read as a whole, contemplates action taken
by an insured to improve its property through either remodel or repair work performed by it or by
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2.

The Undisputed Facts Demonstrate that the Damage to the
Property \Vas Not Authorized

Respondent points to the lease/purchase agreement, and argues that Agreement is
authorization for Reynoso to destroy the residence and its contents. It is not. As noted above,
the only evidence in the record of what "improvements" to the property were contemplated by
the parties is the Affidavit of Shammie Fisher, which states that the "improvements" included
such things as new flooring or upgrades to the kitchen and bathroom floors and counters, new
light and painting. Fisher Aff., at !ff 9 (R. at 85). There was no discussion or agreement for the
Buyer to demolish or rebuild any portion of the premises or remodel the structure. Id.
Authorizing a person to paint a wall is not the same as authorizing them to tear it down anymore
than consent to have a filling is authorization for a dentist to pull all of a patient's teeth. There is
no dispute in this case that the destruction of the property was not authorized by Appellant prior
to its occurring.
Respondent next argues that Appellant consented to having the structure rebuilt, and that
such acquiescence in the reconstruction means that the exclusion applies; essentially, Respondent
argues that once the residence was destroyed, Appellant agreed to have Reynoso rebuild it, and
the covered loss is his inadequate rebuilding of the property. First, this misstates the covered
loss. The covered loss was the destruction of the residence, not the failure to rebuild it.
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repair work done. This is like the situation where a person comes up to a car at a city stop light
and sprays something on the windshield of a car and then charges the person to have it cleaned
off. It cannot be said that the driver "consented" to having their window cleaned. The only
reason the window \Vas dirty was due to the unauthorized act of the person spraying the window.
Similarly, in this case, it cannot be seen as consent for Appellant to allow Reynoso to attempt to
fix the residence after he destroyed it. Consent means "voluntary agreement." Black's Law
Disctionary, 6 1h Ed. In this case, Appellant did not enter into a "voluntary agreement" to allow
Reynoso to perform remodel and construction work on the residence because she was in a forced
position brought about by Reynoso's unlawful and wrongful act. Her acquiescence in the attempt
to rebuild, as set forth in the texts quoted by Respondent in its brief, was not voluntary and
cannot be seen as a voluntary agreement or consent for Reynoso to remodel her residence.
Respondent also argues that the work done by Reynoso was done by or at her direction
because Reynoso was required to give monthly updates for plans and upgrade, and because the
contract between the parties required any subcontractors to sign lien waivers. (R. at 95-96).
These facts are not material because they come from language in the Purchase and Sale
Agreement addressing the "improvements" to be made under that Agreement. As noted above,
the Property Sale Agreement does not define "improvements" and the only evidence of the
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such things as new flooring or upgrades to the kitchen and bathroom floors and counters, new
light and painting. Fisher Aff., at <J[ 9 (R. at 85). Again, the undisputed evidence is that there was
no discussion or agreement for the Buyer to demolish or rebuild any portion of the premises or
remodel the structure. Id. Thus, the language in the Property Sale Agreement requiring
subcontractors to sign lien waivers relates to any painters or other tradesmen who may have
performed the cosmetic upgrades contemplated by the parties and the updates would include
things like pictures of new light fixtures to be installed or information on whether other cosmetic
improvements were being made. That language has nothing to do with the destruction of the
premises or any attempts to fix damage caused by Reynoso and does not demonstrate that
Appellant was directing the work to be done to fix damage Reynoso caused. It relates only to
the cosmetic improvements authorized under the Property Sale Agreement. There is no dispute
that Appellant did not voluntarily participate in the work to be done to fix the destruction caused
by Reynoso.
Appellant likewise did not have knowledge of the destruction of the residence until after
it had happened. The undisputed evidence of record is that Appellant did not have knowledge
that Reynoso would destroy the residence. Respondent wants to argue that the fact that she knew
that "improvements" were to be made is enough, and it doesn't matter that she didn't know that
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make some sense if Appellant had agreed beforehand to allow Reynoso to do major remodel
work. In that case, it might be foreseeable that he would have to demolish the residence in order
to do that work. However, the fact that the work contemplated by Appellant and Reynoso was
cosmetic in nature and was not structural, and the fact that Reynoso represented that he would be
using the house as his primary residence, demonstrate that it was not foreseeable that Reynoso
would level the home, and that Appellant's knowledge of the fact that cosmetic improvements
would be made while he lived in the home cannot be seen as knowledge that he would tear the
home down.

3.

The Case Law Cited By Appellant Supports the Conclusion That the
Exclusion Does Not Apply

Because the Idaho appellate courts have not had the occasion to interpret a policy
provision like the one at issue in this case, Appellant directed the Court to other decisions
wherein courts have interpreted exclusions in policies with the same language, and have found
the exclusion for faulty or inadequate work to apply only to situations where the work was
performed by the insured or someone authorized by the insured. As noted above, the conclusion
of these courts makes sense because it is understood that actions involving construction,
renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction and maintenance are not performed by persons
other than an owner of real property or by someone hired by them to do such work. It is not
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insured or with the insured' s consent. It is implied in the meaning of renovation and repair work.
Respondent attempts to distinguish the cases cited by Appellant, beginning with
Husband v. LaFayette Ins., Co., 635 So.2d 309, 311 (La.App. 1994 ). First, Respondent argues
that Husband is factually distinguishable because in Husband the alterations were taken without
the authorization of the insured and in direct conflict with the terms of the lease, whereas in this
case, Respondent argues that Appellant authorized the destruction of her property. As discussed
at length above, Appellant did not authorize either the destruction of her property nor did she
voluntarily agree to the plans to rebuild it. Morever, just like the situation in Husband,
Reynoso' s actions in destroying the residence were in fact in direct violation of the terms of the
Property Sale Agreement between the parties, which contemplated that Reynoso would live in
the residence while making cosmetic repairs. Thus, Husband is similar factually, and its rational
is persuasive and compelling:

This court interprets the exclusion contained in the pertinent
policy provisions to apply to situations where the insured or
someone authorized by the insured contracts for alterations to
the propertv and is dissatisfied with the quality of the
performance under that contract. The insurer by this exclusion
intended to prevent the expansion of coverage under the policy to
insuring the quality of a contractual undertaking by the insured of
someone authorized by him.
However, in this case the alterations were undertaken without
authorization and in direct conflict with the terms of the lease,

13
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Contrary to the assertions of Respondent, the court in Husband is not reading additional
ianguage into the policy. Rather, the court is recognizing that when repairs or alterations are
done on a property, they are done by or at the direction of the insured. That does not require
additional language. Instead, it interprets the words when read as a whole to mean that repair and
remodel work implies an agreement or authorization to do the work.
Likewise, Respondent's attempts to distinguish Home Savings of Am. v. Cont'! Ins. Co.,
104 Cal.Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct.App. 2001) are unpersuasive. Respondent argues that in Home
Savings, the residence was leveled and for redevelopment and there was not intent to rebuild,
whereas in this case, the residence was not destroyed, it was merely demolished and then
partially rebuilt. However, the fact that the residence in Home Savings was demolished for
redevelopment was not central to the holding that the exclusion did not apply. See 104 Cal.Rptr.
2d at 852-53. Thus, that factual distinction is immaterial. Additionally, the insurance company in
Home Savings argued that the property was destroyed as part of an overall process of renovation,
and that the destruction of the property was just one step in the process of remodeling. Id. at 852.
This is the same argument advanced by Respondent in this case: that the destruction of the
residence was just one step in its renovation. Thus, the differences raised by Respondent do not
make the outcome of the case distinguishable, and Home Savings is still persuasive authority
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forth in those cases, which support a finding that the exclusion does not apply in this case. See
eg., Fidelity Coop. Bank v. Nova Cas. Co., 726 F.3d 31, 38 (i Cir. 2013).
Respondent also argues that a fe\v cases have held that the exclusion applies regardless of
the insured' s authorization of the work, and directs the Court to Wilson v. Farmers Ins. Exchage
in support of its claim that the exclusion applies. 102 Cal.App.4th 1171, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 305
(2002). First, Wilson does not stand for the proposition that the exclusion applies regardless of
the insured's authorization of the work. In fact, the court in Wilson cited the language in
Husband v. Lafayette Ins. Co., that the exclusion for faulty construction or remodeling applied
"to situations where the insured of someone authorized by the insured contracts for alteration to
the property and is dissatisfied with the quality of the performance under that contract." 635
So.2d 309, 311 (La.Ct.App. 1994). Thus, the Wilson court agreed with the general statement of
law in Husband.
However, it then held that, under the facts in Wilson, the exclusion applied because the
insured had knowledge of and authorized the renovation. In fact, the insured in Wilson watched
as the property was partially torn down and did not stop the destruction because he had agreed to
the remodel. The facts in Wilson are distinguishable in that one crucial aspect: the insured in
Wilson knew of the destruction of the property. In fact, he watched the destruction of the
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Wilson saw that Bruce
s son,
was remodeling the house, including replacing some exterior walls
and part of the foundation and putting in new plumbing. Around
March 1997, Wilson saw most of the exterior walls of the house
had been stripped down to the studs.
Id. at 1173, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 306. In Wilson, the insured watched over a period of a month as the

property was partially torn down, and he did not stop it because he had agreed to the remodel.
This is not the situation in this case. In this case, Appellant did not sit idly by and watch
as her property was torn down to the foundation. She did not drive by, as the insured in Wilson
did, over the course of a month and watch as her property was torn down. In fact, the
undisputed facts demonstrate that Appellant was not aware that Reynoso was going to attempt to
tear down and remodel the house and that she was not aware of his intent to destroy the structure
until after she was notified of its complete destruction. Fisher Aff., at 15 (R. at 84). Appellant
did not have an opportunity to stop the destruction of her property and prior to its destruction she
did not have any agreement with Reynoso to have the structure itself remodeled and he was not
authorized to destroy it. Id. at <JI 6. Appellant was not a willing participant in the destruction of
her residence in this case, as the insured in Wilson was, she was a victim. Thus, the holding in
Wilson is distinguishable and the general statements of law in Wilson actually support the

Appellant's claims in this case.
In reaching its decision that the faulty workmanship, construction or renovation exclusion
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that did not address the issue in this case, and one from a federal district court in California,
which deait with facts entirely different from those in this case. Respondent cites both of those
cases and argues that they support the application of the exclusion.
However, in Capelouto v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 900 P.2d 414 (Wash. App. 1999), the
issue of whether the work performed was authorized by or contracted for by the plaintiff was not
even addressed. The plaintiff in Capelouto did not argue that he had not contracted for or
authorized the work done on the sewer line in opposition to the application of the exclusion. At
no point did the court address the issues before the Court in this case, nor did the court address
the decisions and analysis cited in this case. Similarly, Stephens v. Liberty Mut, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12243, 2008 WL 480287 (N.Dist. Cal. 2008), also is not persuasive because that case
does not contain any analysis of the issue of whether the faulty, inadequate or defective
construction applies to situations where an unauthorized third party destroys real property and
involves facts distinguishable from this case.
Based upon the undisputed facts of record, and based upon the case law cited by
Appellant, the decision of the District Court that the exclusion for faulty or inadequate work
applies should be reversed and summary judgment should be granted in favor of Appellant on
that issue.
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The Court Should Hear the Issue of \Vhether The District
Court Erred In Denying Appellant Summary Judgment On the
Intentional Loss Exclusion And Decide It In Favor of
Appellant
The other exclusion raised by Respondent as a basis for denying coverage for the
dwelling and fixtures is the exclusion for intentional loss, which provides:
We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the
following.
h.
Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising out of any act
committed:
( 1)
by or at the direction of you or any person or organization
named as an additional insured; and
(2)
with the intent to cause a loss.
Policy, at 7-8 (R. at 26-27). As to the intentional loss exclusion, the District Court erred in
denying Appellant's motion for summary judgment because the material facts regarding
Appellant's directing or authorizing the acts which caused the loss were not in dispute.
Specifically, the District Court erred in holding that "whether Reynoso' s activities were
authorized by Fisher presents genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment
on the issue of whether the intentional loss exclusion applies." Decision, at 9 (R. at 231 ).
Respondent argues that this issue is not properly considered on appeal because an order
denying a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order from which no direct appeal
may be taken, and that this rule is not altered by the entry of an appealable final judgment.
Dominguez, ex. rel. Hamp v. Evergreen RES, Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 13, 121 P.3d 938, 944 (2005).
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case,
disposing of the entire case. Thus, Appellant is permitted to pursue a direct appeal because the
order appealed did in fact dispose of the entire case. The direct appeal may be taken from the
final order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment, and because a direct appeal is
permitted on that basis, Appellant should be permitted to raise other issues on appeal.
The cases holding that a denial of summary judgment may not be reviewed on appeal
even after a final judgment address the issue of whether, after a trial on the merits, the Court
should revisit the issue of whether summary judgment was improperly denied. See Watson v.
Idaho Falls Consol. Hasps., 111 Idaho 44, 45, 720 P.2d 632 (1986) (appeal after jury trial);
Evans v. Jensen, 103 Idaho 937, 942 (Ct. App. l 982)(explaining the reason for the rule: "The
final judgment in a case can be tested upon the record made at trial, not the record made at the
time summary judgment was denied."). Clearly, after a trial on the merits, it does not make sense
for the Court to review the decision denying a motion for summary judgment.
However, in this case, that policy reason does not apply. There was no trial on the merits
and thus an appeal of the order denying summary judgment is not seeking to second guess any
decision by the trier of fact. In fact, in asking this Court to reverse the District Court and grant
Appellant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the intentional loss exclusion,
Appellant is seeking to conserve judicial resources and prevent the need for a trial upon remand.
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Brief on Appeal, the District Court decision denying summary judgment in favor of Appellant
should be reversed.

III.

CONCLUSION

The District Court's holding and the Respondent's arguments that the loss in this case
was caused directly by faulty inadequate or defective work as set forth in the exclusion is simply
not reasonable or supported by the case law interpreting insurance contracts. Respondent simply
cannot meet its burden in this case to clearly demonstrate the application of the exclusions. The
exclusion for faulty or inadequate work does not apply, and summary judgment should have been
granted to Appellant by the District Court on that issue. Likewise, the exclusion for intentional
loss does not apply and summary judgment should have been granted in Appellant's favor on that
issue.
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully requests the judgment of the District
Court be reversed, and that judgment be entered in favor of the Appellant on the issue of
insurance coverage under the Policy for her losses, holding that no exclusions set forth in the
Policy apply.
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